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I. INTRODUCTION
Each year, tens of thousands of Americans turn to assisted re-
productive technology ("ART") for help in achieving their dreams
of parenthood.' As reported by the Centers for Disease Control,
the proportion of live births to total attempted ART cycles repre-
sents the "success rate" of ART operations,2 and these success
rates are closely monitored in accordance with federal law.'
Unfortunately, in some cases where donated tissue is used in
ART procedures, a genetic defect may be transmitted that results
in the birth of a child suffering from a severe and incurable dis-
ease.' For these families, any bare mathematical concept of "suc-
* J.D. Candidate 2014, Duquesne University School of Law, and Junior Staff Editor,
Duquesne Law Review.
1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010 Assisted Reproductive Technology
Fertility Clinic Success Rates Report, CDC - ART REPORT - DIVISION OF REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH 21, http-//www.cdc.gov/art/ART2010/PDFs/ART_2010_ClinicReport-Full.pdf (last
updated Dec. 20, 2012).
2. Id. at 6.
3. See Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 263a
(2006).
4. See Johnson v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 653 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) (involving a child diagnosed with autosomal polycystic kidney disease, which
was inherited from a sperm donor with a history of same); Paretta v. Med. Offices for Hu-
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cess" may be a woefully inadequate representation of their ART
experience. Nevertheless, there is no federal regulation requiring
screening or testing for genetic defects in donated reproductive
material.' As a result, state courts are left struggling to apply ex-
isting state statutes and traditional tort theory to a wholly new
subset of medical malpractice claims.'
This article will begin by providing an overview of ART proce-
dures and the sparse federal regulations applicable to donated
reproductive tissue. Then, the discussion will turn to the legal
environment in Pennsylvania, which demonstrates that existing
state laws may be unprepared to handle ART-related claims. Spe-
cifically, this article will review state tort precedent, current legis-
lation barring particular tort claims,' and the unintended effect
these laws may have on ART-related actions. Finally, this article
will suggest three changes in Pennsylvania law that would clarify
tort concepts and permit an opportunity for meaningful recovery
in ART-related cases involving donated reproductive material.
These changes include clarification of existing statutory language,
modification of tort laws regarding the measure of damages in
prenatal tort actions, and implementation of regulations that es-
tablish donor screening requirements for genetic defects in repro-
ductive material.
II. BACKGROUND
The phrase "Assisted Reproductive Technology," ("ART") is used
to describe "all treatments or procedures which include the han-
dling of human oocytes' or embryos, including in vitro fertiliza-
tion, gamete intrafallopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian trans-
fer, and such other specific technologies."' Stated more simply,
ART includes "all fertility treatments in which both eggs and
sperm are handled."" This definition is intended to exclude pro-
cedures involving only one source of reproductive material, such
man Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (involving a child suffering from cystic
fibrosis).
5. See infra discussion in Part II.
6. See infra discussion in Part III.
7. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305 (West 2007).
8. "The female reproductive cell, also called an egg." Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, supra note 1, at 477.
9. Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 263a-7(1)
(2006).
10. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 1, at 3.
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as artificial insemination." ART procedures involve "surgically
removing eggs from a woman's ovaries, combining them with
sperm in the laboratory, and returning them to the woman's body
or donating them to another woman."l2 The most popular form of
ART is in vitro fertilization. 13
In 1992, Congress sought to establish a uniform system of certi-
fication and reporting for the "success rates" of ART, so it enacted
the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992
("FCSRCA").14 This act requires all clinics that perform ART pro-
cedures to report annual data to the Centers for Disease Control
("CDC")." The CDC is then responsible for compiling this data
into an annual report detailing the success rates of each reporting
clinic. 1
The most recent CDC Assisted Reproductive Technology report
was published in 2012 and reflects the clinic data reported for cal-
endar year 2010." This report details the procedures of 443 re-
porting clinics throughout the United States, and highlights a to-
tal of 147,260 ART cycles performed in 2010.18 According to the
report, 47,090 live births resulted from the 2010 ART cycles,"
which is more than one and a half times the number of live births
from ART in 2001.20 Notably, while the total number of live births
increased over 60% from 2001 to 2010,21 the total number of ART
cycles performed increased only 37% during the same time peri-
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 263a.
15. Id. § 263a-1.
16. Id. § 263a-5. Under the FCSRCA, the CDC was also required to "develop a model
program for the certification of embryo laboratories, to be carried out voluntarily by inter-
ested states." Implementation of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of
1992 - A Model Program for the Certification of Embryo Laboratories; Notice, 64 Fed. Reg.
39374 (July 21, 1999). However, the resulting model act does not require donor screening
for genetic disease, nor genetic testing for donated reproductive material. Id.
17. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 1, at 4-5.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010 Assisted Reproductive Technology
National Summary Report, CDC - ART REPORT - DIVISION OF REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 52,
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2010/PDFs/ART_2010 NationalSummary Report.pdf (last
updated Jan. 30, 2013). A total of 61,564 infants resulted from the 47,090 live births at-
tributed to ART in 2010. Id.
20. Id. The CDC reports 29,344 live births from ART in 2001, which resulted in 40,687
infants. Id.
21. Id. CDC data shows 29,344 live births from ART cycles conducted in 2001 and
47,090 live births from ART cycles conducted in 2010. Id.
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od.22 Thus, it appears as though the increase in the total number
of births is not due merely to an increase in ART cycles, but may
also be attributed to scientific advancements.
However, despite the reporting requirements of the FCSRCA,
the legislation did not mandate quality standards for ART proce-
dures, nor did it provide any requirements specific to donated re-
productive material.23 In fact, this aspect of ART went largely un-
regulated until the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") enact-
ed provisions of the Human Tissue Regulations that pertain spe-
cifically to donor eligibility, including donor screening and test-
* 24ing. Under the FDA's Human Tissue Regulations, establish-
ments that engage in the "manufacture of human cells, tissues
and cellular and tissue-based products"25 are required to follow
specific instructions for the "recovery, processing, storage, label-
ing, packaging, or distribution of any human cell or tissue, and the
screening or testing of the cell or tissue donor. 26
To make clear that these provisions apply to the components of
ART, the Human Tissue Regulations define "[hiuman cells, tis-
sues, or cellular or tissue-based products (HCT/Ps)" as "articles
consisting of human cells or tissues," which "include, but are not
limited to . . . semen or other reproductive tissue."27 Also, the reg-
ulations separately define the term "transfer" to mean "the place-
ment of human reproductive cells or tissues into a human recipi-
ent. 28
With regard to donated HCT/P material, the FDA requires a
donor-eligibility determination 29 based on individual donor screen-
ing and testing.o The screening regulations specifically mandate
that the donor's "relevant medical records"" are reviewed for "risk
factors for, and clinical evidence of, relevant communicable dis-
22. Id. CDC data shows 107,587 total ART cycles in 2001 and 147,260 total ART cycles
in 2010. Id.
23. Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 263a-7(1)
(2006).
24. FDA Human Tissue Regulations, 21 C.F.R. § 1271.45 (2005).
25. Id. § 1271.3(b).
26. Id. § 1271.3(e).
27. Id. § 1271.3(d).
28. Id. § 1271.3(g).
29. Id. § 1271.45(b).
30. Id. § 1271.50. Note, however, that neither the screening nor testing requirements
of this section apply to material donated for autologous use or material donated by a sex-
ually intimate partner. Id. § 1271.90.
31. Id. § 1271.3(s) (defining "relevant medical records" as a "collection of documents
that includes a current donor medical history interview" as well as available laboratory test
results, medical records and other information pertaining to communicable diseases).
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ease agents and diseases,"32 which include viruses such as HIV,
Hepatitis B and Hepatitis C." For donated repioductive material,
such as the semen and oocytes that may be used in ART proce-
dures, the regulations add screening requirements for "relevant
communicable diseases of the genitourinary tract, such as chla-
mydia and gonorrhea."" Similarly, the testing regulations require
that donor specimens are tested for "evidence of infection due to
relevant communicable disease agents."
However, just as ART provides society with new and inventive
ways to overcome infertility, it also provides unique risks that are
relatively new to the legal landscape. For example, donated re-
productive material is unique from other donated tissue because
its purpose is to create human life rather than provide therapeutic
treatment for the recipient. Thus, donated reproductive tissue
often plays an integral role in determining the genetic makeup of
infants conceived through ART, and the FDA regulations regard-
ing communicable disease agents stop short of establishing any
standards for the identification of genetic defects in donors or do-
nated material.
There are instances in which failed screening, testing or coun-
seling practices in an ART procedure have resulted in the birth of
an infant afflicted with serious illness or deformity." In these in-
stances, courts have been faced with relatively new tort concepts
such as wrongful birth and wrongful life.3 Both wrongful birth
and wrongful life are medical-malpractice actions," but the im-
portant distinction between them is the party alleging injury. In a
wrongful birth case, "the parents of an unhealthy child born fol-
lowing negligent genetic counseling or negligent failure to diag-
nose a fetal defect or disease" institute an action on the basis that
"they were wrongfully deprived of the ability to avoid or terminate
a pregnancy to prevent the birth of a child with the defect or dis-
ease."" However, in a wrongful life action, the unhealthy child
resulting from "a negligently performed sterilization . . . or negli-
32. Id. § 1271.75(a).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 1271.75(c).
35. Id. § 1271.85.
36. See Johnson v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002); Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
37. Schirmer v. Mount Auburn Obstetrics & Gynecologic Assocs., Inc., 844 N.E.2d 1160,
1164 (Ohio 2006) (defining wrongful birth and wrongful life actions in Ohio).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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gent genetic counseling or testing argues that he or she has been
damaged by being born at all."40 The former cause of action is
permitted in some jurisdictions, but the vast majority of jurisdic-
tions refuse to recognize a cause of action for wrongful life.4 1
In late 2012, the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology
("SART") attempted to prevent these situations and fill the gap in
FDA regulations by publishing the "Recommendations for evalua-
tion of potential sperm, oocyte and embryo donation."4 2 SART is
the "primary organization of professionals dedicated to the prac-
tice of assisted reproductive technologies . . . in the United
States,"4 3 and the organization works closely with the CDC in de-
veloping the annual report required under the FCSRCA.44 More
than 375 ART clinics in the United States are members of SART,45
and it is a requirement of membership that each facility adhere to
all SART guidelines.4 6 Additionally, SART requires its members
to obtain laboratory accreditation through the College of American
Pathologists ("CAP"), or The Joint Commission ("JCHOA").4 7
The guidelines titled "Recommendations for gamete and embryo
donation: a committee opinion" - published in October 2012 - set
forth "recommendations for evaluation of potential sperm, oocyte
and embryo donors,"4 which in many instances are "more strin-
gent than the FDA minimum requirements."4 9 For example, these
guidelines recommend particular tests for oocyte recipients and
their partners.o The guidelines also recommend a list of factors to
be considered for the selection, screening and testing of potential
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med. and Soc'y for Assisted Reprod. Tech., Recommendations
for gamete and embryo donation: a committee opinion, ASRM GUIDELINES FOR PRACTICE
(Oct. 16, 2012),
http://www.sart.org/uploadedFiles/ASRMContent/News-andPublications/PracticeGuidel
ines/Guidelinesand_MinimumStandards/2008_Guidelines for-gamete(1).pdf (last visited
January 18, 2013).
43. SART: What is SART?, SART.ORG, http://www.sart.org/Whatis SART/ (last visit-
ed January 18, 2013).
44. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 1, at iv.
45. SART: What is SART?, SART.ORG, http://www.sart.org/What is SART/ (last visit-
ed January 18, 2013). This equates to more than 85% of the ART clinics in the country. Id.
46. Requirements for SART Membership, SART.ORG,
http://www.sart.org/uploadedFiles/Affiliates/SARTIMembers/Membership%20Requirements
%2007_08.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
47. Id.
48. Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med. and Soc'y for Assisted Reprod. Tech., supra note 42, at
1.
49. Id.
50. Id at 8.
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oocyte donors." Specifically, when selecting donors SART recom-
mends that "the donor should undergo appropriate genetic evalua-
tion based on history, in accordance with ethnic background and
current guidelines," "cystic fibrosis testing should be performed on
all donors," and "consideration should be given to fragile X testing
on donors, but is not required."52 Additionally, the guidelines for
screening a potential donor recommend that "[dlonors should be
healthy and give no history to suggest hereditary disease."" Simi-
lar guidelines apply for embryo donation.
Unfortunately, despite the thorough recommendations provided
by SART, there is nothing to suggest that ART clinics are required
to participate in SART in the first instance. Moreover, although
SART may be entitled to rescind the membership of any non-
compliant clinic, the guidelines themselves do not provide redress
for a family injured by the actions or omissions of the non-
compliant facility. In fact, SART give a nod of deference to the
decisions of individual facility physicians by expressly stating that
the guidelines are "not intended to be a protocol to be applied in
all situations, and cannot substitute for the individual judgment of
the treating physicians."" As a result, tort concepts remain the
only avenue through which families affected by a non-member or
non-compliant ART clinic might seek relief.
III. ANALYSIS
A. State of the Law in Pennsylvania
The most recent CDC Assisted Reproductive Technology report
documents nineteen ART facilities in Pennsylvania, which at-
tempted a total of 4,424 ART cycles in 2010." Of the nineteen fa-
cilities operating in Pennsylvania, fifteen are identified as mem-
bers of SART, and the majority maintain CAP or JCHOA labora-
tory accreditation." Fortunately, a review of Pennsylvania au-
thority suggests the Commonwealth has not yet faced a case re-
garding a child disabled by genetic defect as a result of absent or
51. Id.
52. Id. at 9.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 12.
55. ASRM Guidelines for Practice, SART.ORG, httpf//www.sart.org/guidelines/ (last
visited January 18, 2013).
56. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 1, at 357-75.
57. Id.
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negligent genetic screening, testing or counseling in an ART pro-
cedure. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania's legal landscape is framed
such that ART patients and their children will have little, if any,
recourse should such a case arise."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania first introduced the Com-
monwealth to the concept of prenatal torts5" in the 1981 case of
Speck v. Finegold." In this case, Frank and Dorothy Speck were
parents to two children suffering from an inherited defect causing
neurofibromatosis." "For genetic and economic reasons," the
Specks decided against having any additional children and en-
gaged a urologist to perform a vasectomy upon Mr. Speck.62 When
Mrs. Speck subsequently became pregnant, the couple engaged
another physician to terminate Mrs. Speck's pregnancy.6 3 Despite
these efforts to avoid, and then to terminate, this pregnancy, Mrs.
Speck gave birth to a third child with neurofibromatosis.64
In evaluating the remedies available to the Speck family, the
court concluded it would "approve a cause of action brought by the
parents of an unplanned, unwanted, genetically defective child for
the birth of that child."" The court suggested to hold otherwise
would frustrate "the fundamental policies of tort law in the Com-
monwealth: to compensate the victim, deter negligence, and en-
courage due care,"" and determined that foreseeable damages for
mental distress were permissible in addition to the "usual com-
mon-law principles of damages."6
The court also approved "a cause of action brought by an un-
planned, unwanted, genetically defective child for the child's
58. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Hosp. of the Med. Coll. of Pa., 634 A.2d 1099, 1105 (Pa. 1993)
(noting that state statute both complicates Pennsylvania tort law and eliminates a cause of
action available to parents of a child suffering from genetic disease); Ellis v. Sherman, 515
A.2d 1327, 1329-30 (Pa. 1986) (holding no cause of action available on behalf of minor child
suffering from genetic disease).
59. Schirmer v. Mount Auburn Obstetrics & Gynecologic Assocs., Inc., 844 N.E.2d 1160,
1164 (Ohio 2006) (illustrating typical categories of prenatal torts, including wrongful preg-
nancy, wrongful birth and wrongful life).
60. 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981).
61. Id. at 112.
62. Id. at 113.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania later clarified that it considered this action
to be a claim sounding in medical malpractice, rather than styled as wrongful birth or
wrongful life. Jenkins v. Hosp. of the Med. Coll. of Pa., 634 A.2d 1099, 1105 (Pa. 1993).
66. Speck, 439 A.2d at 114.
67. Id.
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birth," and expressly rejected the view of other jurisdictions that
such actions should be barred due to the impossible task of calcu-
lating the value of existence." Rather, the court commented that
jurisdictions "holding such views are apparently able to overlook
what is plain to see: that - in cases such as this - a diseased plain-
tiff exists and, . . . would not exist at all but for the negligence of
the defendants."0
One year later, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania examined
the ruling in Speck with regard to damages for the birth of an un-
planned, unwanted but healthy child." In Mason v. Western
Pennsylvania Hospital, a divided court held that when an improp-
er sterilization procedure results in the birth of a healthy child,
the parents are "entitled to recover all medical expenses and lost
wages related to pre-natal care, delivery, and post-natal care, as
well as compensation for pain and suffering incurred during the
pre-natal through post-natal periods."7 2 However, these parents
are not entitled to damages for "emotional distress and the ex-
penses of raising the child until the 'age of maturity,'" which
would otherwise be available under Speck if the child at issue
were diseased or disabled."
By 1986, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania began to depart
from the broad protections afforded to prenatal tort claims under
Speck.74 In Ellis v. Sherman, for example, the court examined
"whether a child born with a debilitating disease may bring an
action. against medical practitioners who fail to advise his parents
of the probability that he will be born with such a disease, thus
foreclosing parental opportunity to avoid the pregnancy and to
prevent his being born."" At the outset, the Ellis case differed
slightly from Speck because the plaintiffs did not allege a negli-
gent performance of sterilization procedures. Rather, the plain-
tiffs in Ellis claimed family doctors failed to advise them before or
during their pregnancy that Mr. Ellis carried the hereditary dis-
68. Id. at 113. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania later clarified that it considered
this action to be the definition of wrongful birth in the Commonwealth until legislative
intervention in 1988. Jenkins, 634 A.2d at 1105.
69. Speck, 439 A.2d at 115.
70. Id.
71. Mason v. W. Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974, 976 (Pa. 1982).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Ellis v. Sherman, 515 A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1986).
75. Id. at 1328.
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ease known as neurofibromatosis." Unfortunately, the disease
was passed on to the Ellis' child, which resulted in "severe mental
retardation, physical and motor development delay, deformity,
and seizures.""
However, where the court once saw a diseased plaintiff deserv-
ing of redress," they now saw a child-plaintiff without a cause of
action for the "alleged" injury of his birth." Indeed, the court sub-
scribed to the "hyper-scholastic rationale"" rejected in Speck by
holding the "assertion that the child has been injured by its exist-
ence as too speculative" for determination. More specifically, the
court applied the benefit rule,8 2 under which "special benefits" con-
ferred to the plaintiff by tortious conduct offset the harm caused
by the tortious conduct." Because the court could not "say how
the child's pain and suffering will compare to the benefits of its
life,"84 it could not be determined that "its life constitutes an inju-
ry. "85
While this rationale alone has been sufficient to dispose of the
infant's claims in many jurisdictions," the Ellis court also adopted
a second theory, which relied on the legal definition of "injury."
In fact, the court devoted nearly one-third of its opinion to a dis-
cussion focused on the distinction between tortious interference
and traditional human pro-creation." Though ultimately conclud-
ing that the plaintiff in Ellis lacked an injury because the harm
was a result of the "plaintiffs genetic constitution"" and was not
"inflicted upon the plaintiff"'0 by any person, the court left open
the possibility that "this condition presumably would constitute a
legal injury if it had been inflicted [upon the plaintiffJ by some
negligent or intentional act of another."" Finally, the court reit-
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 115 (Pa. 1981).
79. Ellis, 515 A.2d at 1328.
80. See Speck, 439 A.2d at 115.
81. Ellis, 515 A.2d at 1329.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 644 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2002) (discussing lack of cognizable injury).
87. Ellis, 515 A.2d at 1329.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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erated its holding in language prophetically suited for the advent
of ART: "When life comes into being unimpeded by outside forces
and is formed solely by its own internal controls, that life cannot
be said to constitute an injury."9 2 Thus, it seems that the Ellis
court successfully limited the scope of a child's claim under Speck
but retained a cause of action for situations where the plaintiffs
genetic constitution is man-made and assembled externally, as is
the case with most ART procedures.
Also, in Ellis, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expressly
preserved the parents' right to relief under Speck.9 3 Before dispos-
ing of the case, the court noted that the "parents' right of recovery
is not at issue,"94 and concluded the Ellis family would be able to
recover for mental anguish as well as expenses related to the birth
and care of their child if successful in establishing their claim."
Two years later, the Pennsylvania legislature eliminated any
such gaps existing in the Ellis decision, and enacted a statutory
prohibition on both wrongful birth and wrongful life claims." The
statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) Wrongful birth. - There shall be no cause of action or
award of damages on behalf of any person based on a claim
that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, a person
once conceived would not or should not have been born . . . .
(b) Wrongful life. - There shall be no cause of action on behalf
of any person based on a claim of that person, that, but for an
act or omission of the defendant, the person would not have
been conceived or, once conceived, would or should have been
aborted.
(c) Conception. - A person shall be deemed to be conceived at
the moment of fertilization."
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1330.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305 (West 2007). The Pennsylvania Superior Court
recently held this statute unconstitutional on procedural grounds. Sernovitz v. Dershaw,
57 A.3d 1254 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding section 8305 is unconstitutional under the single-
subject rule of Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution); contra Dansby v.
Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816, 818 (Pa. Super. 1993) (upholding section 8305
against substantive constitutional challenges on the basis that "lawfully enacted legislation
enjoys a presumption of constitutionality")
97. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305.
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Almost immediately thereafter, the Pennsylvania judiciary
struggled with the application of the new statute." For example,
in the 1989 case of Hatter v. Landsberg, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania evaluated a claim brought by parents of a healthy
child, who was conceived and born after a negligently performed
tubal ligation.99 The Hatters sought damages for "pre and post-
natal expenses, pain and suffering, and emotional distress,"o
stemming from the unwanted and unplanned pregnancy. Mean-
while, the defendant physician argued that section 8305 barred
the Hatters' claim by abolishing any cause of action for wrongful
birth or wrongful life.101 At the outset, the court identified that
the wrongful life provision was not at issue, because there was no
action brought on behalf of the child.102 However, the court
deemed the statutory language of the wrongful birth provision
unclear, and relied on legislative history to determine whether the
statute barred claims such as those presented by the Hatters.103
Citing to legislative debates regarding section 8305, the court
introduced Pennsylvania to a third type of prenatal tort: wrongful
conception. 0 4 Under Hatter, wrongful conception is defined as "an
action seeking damages for negligence occurring prior to concep-
tion,"1os and these actions may include claims against physicians
for "so-called botched or fully negligent sterilization."o' Addition-
ally, upon review of the legislative history, the court concluded
that the legislative intent of section 8305 was to eliminate "suits
brought by children or their parents in an effort to recover damag-
es for failure to abort a child or negligently aborting a child,"o'0 so
as to "prevent law suits leading to eugenic abortions of deformed
or unwanted children."0 s The court directly concluded section
8305 was "not intended to bar cases of 'wrongful conception," 0o
and this new terminology allowed the court to dispose of the case
in a manner wholly consistent with the Mason precedent.
98. Hatter v. Landsberg, 563 A.2d 146 (Pa. Super. 1989).
99. Id. at 148.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 150.
104. Id. at 149.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 150.
108. Id.
109. Id.
Vol. 51524
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Four years later, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania used the
case of Jenkins v. Hospital of Medical College of Pennsylvania to
express its disapproval of the prenatal tort statute.110 Through a
review of its precedent in Ellis, Mason and Speck, the court sug-
gested that the legislation confuses, rather than clarifies, wrongful
birth and wrongful life actions."
First, the court employed its holding in Ellis to define "wrongful
birth" as "a lawsuit brought on behalf of an infant who was born
... deformed and diseased as the result of the failure of physicians
to inform its parents of the possibility of diseased birth."112 Gen-
erally, the court agreed with the legislature in that there is no
recognized cause of action available on behalf of the child."3 How-
ever, contrary to the Ellis definition, claims brought on behalf of
the child are termed "wrongful life" actions under section 8305.11'
Next, the court addressed the statutory definition of "wrongful
birth,""' in contrast to existing tort precedent."' The court main-
tained that, until the enactment of section 8305, "lawsuits brought
by parents in these cases for their own alleged injuries were not
referred to as 'wrongful birth' actions, but merely as medical mal-
practice actions.""' Thus, the court concluded the statute "intro-
duces confusion" and eliminates a cause of action afforded to par-
ents in tort cases for over a decade." 8
B. Changing the Legal Landscape in Pennsylvania to Afford
ART Patients Appropriate Relief for Medical Malpractice
Claims
The current state of Pennsylvania law creates significant chal-
lenges for ART patients seeking recovery for medical malpractice.
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical:"' Mr. and Mrs.
Parent ("Parents") suffered from infertility and, at the recommen-
dation of a physician, agreed to undergo in vitro fertilization pro-
110. 634 A.2d 1099, 1105 (Pa. 1993).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(b) (West 2007).
115. Jenkins, 634 A.2d at 1105.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. The facts of this hypothetical are actually those from the case of Paretta v. Medical
Offices for Human Reproduction, 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641-42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
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cedures using an ovum donor.120 The Parents were given very spe-
cific information about a potential ovum donor, including her reli-
gious affiliation, sexual orientation, height, eye color, skin tone
and facial structure. 12' Allegedly, the fertility clinic also advised
the Parents that the donor did not have a history of mental illness
or genetic diseases.'22 Pleased with this information, the Parents
decided to pair the donor's eggs with Mr. Parent's sperm in hopes
of a successful pregnancy.123 However, despite the customary test-
ing procedures at the clinic, neither the clinic nor the physician
informed the Parents that their selected donor was a carrier of
cystic fibrosis.'24 As a result of this omission, Mr. Parent was not
tested to ascertain his status as a carrier of cystic fibrosis and the
resulting child ("Baby") was born with the disease. 125 During her
first few months of life, Baby was placed in intensive care, under-
went multiple surgeries, and required a colostomy bag.'26 For the
remainder of her life, it is expected Baby will require medication
and hospital care.'27
In Pennsylvania, it is well-established there is no recourse
available on behalf of Baby.128 Mr. and Mrs. Parent, on the other
hand, face two specific hurdles with regard to their potential
claim. First, it must be determined whether there is a cause of
action available to them in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Then, if a cause of action exists, the scope of permissible damages
must be defined.
After a review of Pennsylvania precedent and statutory re-
strictions, it is important to identify the specific allegations poten-
tial plaintiffs are likely to raise. For example, Mr. and Mrs. Par-
ent may file a complaint based on negligent genetic testing and
disclosure prior to the joining of Mr. Parent's sperm with the do-
nor oocyte. This negligent conduct, occurring before conception,
would fall within the scope of Pennsylvania's "wrongful concep-
120. Id. at 641.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 642.
127. Id.
128. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(b) (West 2007).
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tion" action.129 As such, their case should not be affected by sec-
tion 8305.'
However, the current state of the law in Pennsylvania requires
strict discipline in the court's analysis of related, but chronologi-
cally distinct, ART claims. Suppose, for example, the parent-
plaintiffs in our hypothetical situation opted to include an allega-
tion of failure to disclose genetic information during the pregnancy
period. Under current Pennsylvania law, this allegation may
push our plaintiffs claim into the realm of wrongful birth actions,
and the prohibitions of section 8305 would terminate their
claim."' Likewise, Mr. and Mrs. Parent may have conceded their
desire to abort the fetus had they been informed of the genetic de-
fect. Again, this pushes the claim into the realm of wrongful birth
actions, and it is barred under section 8305. Thus, for Parents'
action to succeed, the allegations must be evaluated in chronologi-
cal order, with a bright line separating pre-conception claims from
post-conception claims.132
Once it is established that the plaintiffs' wrongful conception ac-
tion can proceed, we turn to the issue of damages. At current, the
scope of damages permitted in a wrongful conception action is
commensurate with the harm resulting from a negligent steriliza-
tion procedure."' However, the Hatter court did not define wrong-
ful conception so narrowly,134 and it is reasonable to believe the
costs of tending to a child with serious genetic defects significantly
129. Hatter v. Landsberg, 563 A.2d 146, 149 (Pa. Super. 1989).
130. Id.
131. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a) (West 2007). This eliminates the prophylactic
effect of tort law, as discussed in Speck, and may have the practical effect of incenting prac-
titioners to delay genetic testing/counseling until the shield of section 8305 is firmly in
place. Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 114 (Pa. 1981).
132. Under the facts of this case, the pre-conception claim stems from Parents' missed
opportunity to select other gametes in the first instance due to negligence occurring before
conception. This is Parents' wrongful conception claim, which should be recognized as a
viable cause of action. That Parents, in hind-sight, acknowledge they may have aborted the
pregnancy does not convert their pre-conception action based on a missed opportunity to
select other gametes into a post-conception action based on a missed opportunity for abor-
tion.
133. Hatter, 563 A.2d at 150; Mason v. W. Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974, 976 (Pa. 1982) (ma-
jority opinion) (limiting damages to the costs of "pre-natal care, delivery, and post-natal
care, as well as compensation for pain and suffering incurred during the pre-natal through
post-natal periods"). However, it has been argued that even the damages associated with a
negligent sterilization procedure should not be so limited. Mason, 453 A.2d at 976-79
(O'Brien, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
134. Hatter, 563 A.2d at 149 (defines wrongful conception as "an action seeking damages
for negligence occurring prior to conception," but does not limit the action to cases involving
only negligent sterilization).
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surpass the "financial and emotional costs of raising a healthy
child," which are non-compensable in Pennsylvania."'
In order to correct the inequities facing ART plaintiffs in Penn-
sylvania, there are three relatively simple courses of action rec-
ommended for the Commonwealth. First, to eliminate confusion
and ambiguity regarding the naming conventions for prenatal
torts, the Pennsylvania legislature might update section 8305 to
include a provision defining the term "wrongful conception,"136 and
expressly preserving a cause of action for wrongful conception
claims brought by any person other than the resulting child. For
illustrative purposes, the new provision may read as follows: "(d)
Wrongful conception. - Wrongful conception shall be defined as
any action seeking damages for negligence occurring prior to con-
ception, and no prior provision of this section shall be construed to
extinguish a cause of action for wrongful conception."
Though it does not subscribe to the term "wrongful conception,"
Oklahoma statute provides an example of how "eugenic abortion"
claims might be limited without barring other prenatal tort ac-
tions.13 1 At the outset, the Oklahoma legislature makes clear
"that the birth of a child does not constitute a legally recognizable
injury and that it is contrary to public policy to award damages
because of the birth of a child or for the rearing of that child."138
Thus, under Oklahoma statute, "in a wrongful life action or a
wrongful birth action, no damages may be recovered for any condi-
tion that existed at the time of a child's birth if the claim is that
the defendant's act or omission contributed to the mother's not
having obtained an abortion.""' However, the statute then clari-
fies that the prior sections - aimed at protecting public policy
against abortion-based claims - "shall not preclude causes of ac-
tion based on claims that, but for a wrongful act or omission, ....
disease, or disability of an individual prior to birth would have
been prevented, cured, or ameliorated in a manner that preserved
the health and life of the affected individual."14 0
Idaho has gone even further by adopting a statute that effective-
ly delineates between "eugenic abortion" claims and other prena-
tal tort actions in general terms without the confusing prenatal
135. Mason, 453 A.2d at 976.
136. Id.
137. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741.12 (West 2012).
138. Id. § 1-741.12(A).
139. Id. § 1-741.12(C).
140. Id. § 1-741.12(D).
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tort nomenclature.14 ' The statute simply mandates that "a cause
of action shall not arise, and damages shall not be awarded, on
behalf of any person, based on the claim that but for the act or
omission of another, a person would not have been permitted to
have been born alive but would have been aborted."142 The statute
then preserves potential causes of action for other prenatal torts
in language substantially similar to that of Oklahoma.'43 Howev-
er, there is a notable addition to the language of the Idaho statute
in that it leaves open the opportunity for ART-based actions by
stating that the "provisions of this section shall not preclude caus-
es of action based on claims that, but for a wrongful act or omis-
sion, fertilization would not have occurred."'" These statutes
demonstrate that it is possible to protect the public interest
against eugenic abortions'45 without a complete bar to prenatal
tort claims. The review of Pennsylvania law implies that the
Commonwealth intends the same effect by statutorily barring
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims, but judicially preserving
the cause of action for wrongful conception. To clarify, and afford
redress for ART-based claims that may arise in Pennsylvania, the
legislature need only update statutory language to expressly pro-
vide protection for wrongful conception claims.
Next, tort reform is necessary in Pennsylvania with respect to
damages permitted under a wrongful conception claim. Because
ART-based wrongful conception actions may involve severe and
incurable genetic defects, the Pennsylvania courts must allow flex-
ibility in determining the scope of damages, which may require a
departure from Hatter.'4 6 This is not to suggest all wrongful con-
ception claims should entitle plaintiffs to extensive damages, but
simply to acknowledge that varying classes of wrongful conception
claims may require varied compensation.
141. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334 (West 2012).
142. Id. § 5-334(1).
143. Id. § 5-334(2).
144. Id.
145. Despite the state interest in preventing eugenic abortions, the recent case of Catlin
v. Hamburg affords a plaintiff alleging pre-conception negligence a greater opportunity for
recovery if an abortion actually occurred. Catlin v. Hamburg, 56 A.3d 914, 924-25 (Pa.
Super. 2012) (holding that, where plaintiff opted to abort a fetus with congenital abnormal-
ities following a negligent sterilization procedure, the Mason limit on damages is not ap-
propriate and victim must be compensated for "all that they suffer from the tort of anoth-
er").
146. Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 647 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2002) (indicating scope of damages for ART-based claims may include the cost of care and
treatment for their child as well as punitive damages).
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Finally, Pennsylvania should consider regulating facilities en-
gaged in the manufacture of HTC/P products, as defined in the
FDA Human Tissue Regulations.'4 7 Because the Human Tissue
Regulations stop short of providing direction on genetic testing of
reproductive material, it is recommended that the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania adopt a variation of these regulations enhanced to
include key screening provisions for genetic defects. For clarity,
the Commonwealth should adopt a variation of 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3,
which defines the terminology used throughout the subsequent
sections. Within this section, Pennsylvania should modify 21
C.F.R. § 1271.3(n) to include a mention of genetic defects, and re-
vise 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(s) to include "records or other information
received from any source pertaining to genetic defects or diseases"
in its definition of "relevant medical records.""4 s Also, the state
regulation should adopt a variation of 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75, updat-
ed to include a provision requiring facilities to review donor medi-
cal records for information relating to genetic defects.149 These
simple regulatory enactments provide for the health and welfare
of Pennsylvania's current and future citizens,5 o establish a rea-
sonable standard of care for genetic screening in the ART indus-
try, and reduce the likelihood of ART-related wrongful conception
claims without imposing incremental costs on the ART provid-
ers.' 1 Alternately, the Commonwealth might adopt the Human
Tissue Regulations in their existing form for minimum require-
ments, and supplement the regulation by adopting the SART
guidelines specific to donor selection, screening and testing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Assisted reproductive technology is a rapidly growing area of
medical practice in the United States that often uses donated re-
productive material to overcome patient infertility. However,
there is scant regulation regarding donor screening or genetic test-
ing of donated reproductive material. Thus, when cases arise in-
147. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3 (2007).
148. Id. § 1271.3(s).
149. Id. § 1271.75(a).
150. Pennsylvania has stated its interest in safeguarding the health and wellbeing of its
citizens through regulation of other medical facilities, such as blood banks. 35 P.S. § 6502
(2012).
151. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(s) (2007) (indicating establishments are already tasked with
reviewing relevant records for other factors, which suggests there would be no incremental
burden in reviewing them with an eye to genetic defects).
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volving diseased children born of ART procedures, state courts are
left piecing together existing state statutes and tort precedent to
determine the relief, if any, available to ART plaintiffs.
Unfortunately, a review of Pennsylvania law demonstrates that
the Commonwealth may be unprepared for the advent of ART-
related claims. In fact, where Ellis left open the possibility for
ART-related tort claimsl 52 a state statute now bars all "wrongful
life" and related "wrongful birth" actions.15 3 In this environment,
a prenatal tort claim - whether ART-related or otherwise - can
exist only under the theory of "wrongful conception." As such,
Hatter limits recovery to the costs of pregnancy and delivery,
which may be harshly inadequate compensation for a family rais-
ing a child suffering from an incurable genetic defect.
Overall, there are a few key concerns the Commonwealth should
address to allow ART plaintiffs a fair opportunity for relief. First,
it must be clear that ART-related claims of the type discussed
herein are categorized as "wrongful conception" actions so as not
to be automatically barred by section 8305. This can be accom-
plished by updating the current statutory language to delineate
between the three categories of prenatal torts in Pennsylvania.
Next, courts should be cognizant that ART-related tort claims may
require a more flexible measurement of damages than is currently
allowed under Hatter. Finally, to protect the welfare of its citizens
and establish a clear standard of care regarding donated reproduc-
tive material, the Commonwealth should adopt regulatory provi-
sions pertaining to mandatory donor screening for genetic disease.
Together, these changes will offer much-needed clarification to the
prenatal torts and transform Pennsylvania law such that it may
protect both the interests of the Commonwealth and the interests
of families relying on assisted reproductive technology.
152. Ellis v. Sherman, 515 A.2d 1327, 1329 (Pa. 1986).
153. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305 (West 2007).
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